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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Political scientists and legal scholars have written a good deal in 
recent years on the consequences of Supreme Court decisions.1 Much 
of this scholarship has been skeptical of the Court’s capacity to pro-
duce significant social change. Most notably, Professor Gerald N. Ro-
senberg has declared the notion that courts can reform society a 
“hollow hope.”2 Rosenberg shows that Brown v. Board of Education3 
produced very little school desegregation until Congress passed 
landmark civil rights legislation to implement the Court’s ruling.4 He 
also makes a strong case that Brown played a less instrumental role 
in the 1960s civil rights movement than is commonly believed.5 Simi-
                                                                                                                    
*James Monroe Professor of Law, Albert C. Tate, Jr., Research Professor, and Professor of 
History, University of Virginia. B.A., M.A., University of Pennsylvania; J.D., Stanford Law 
School; D. Phil., Oxford University. I am grateful to Daryl Levinson, Rick Pildes, and Mark 
Tushnet for their helpful comments on an earlier draft. Stephanie Russek provided ex-
traordinary research assistance, and, as always, I am indebted to the reference librarians 
at the University of Virginia School of Law for the superb research help they regularly 
provide. A revised version of this Article will appear in a chapter of my forthcoming book, 
provisionally entitled NEITHER HERO, NOR VILLAIN: THE SUPREME COURT, RACE AND THE 
CONSTITUTION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (Oxford Univ. Press). As the Mason Ladd lec-
turer at The Florida State University College of Law in February, 2001, I was privileged to 
present material from a different chapter of that book. I am grateful to both the students 
and the faculty at Florida State for the warm and enthusiastic reception they accorded me 
on that occasion. I owe special thanks to Mark Seidenfeld for making that occasion possi-
ble. 
 1. See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991); LEVERAGING THE LAW: USING THE COURTS TO ACHIEVE SOCIAL 
CHANGE (David A. Schultz ed., 1998); STEPHEN L. WASBY, THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT: SOME PERSPECTIVES (1970). 
 2. ROSENBERG, supra note 1. 
 3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 4. ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 49-54. 
 5. Id. at 107-56. See also Gerald N. Rosenberg, Brown Is Dead! Long Live Brown!: 
The Endless Attempt to Canonize a Case, 80 VA. L. REV. 161 (1994) (giving Brown almost 
no credit for inspiring the civil rights movement). But cf. David J. Garrow, Hopelessly Hol-
low History: Revisionist Devaluing of Brown v. Board of Education, 80 VA. L. REV. 151 
(1994) (giving Brown tremendous credit); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and 
the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7 (1994) (arguing that Brown indirectly acceler-
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larly, my own research has found that the Supreme Court’s first ma-
jor criminal procedure decisions, which disproportionately involved 
Southern blacks who had suffered egregious mistreatment from the 
Jim Crow criminal justice system, had almost no impact on reform-
ing that system.6 Southern blacks continued to be almost universally 
excluded from juries, beaten into confessing crimes they may or may 
not have committed, and convicted of capital offenses after sham tri-
als in which generally apathetic court-appointed lawyers simply 
went through the motions of providing a defense. 
 It would be a mistake, however, to conclude on the basis of such 
studies that Supreme Court decisions in the civil rights context never 
made a difference.7 The Court’s most important white primary deci-
sion, Smith v. Allwright,8 inaugurated a political revolution in the 
urban South. This Article considers both the circumstances that en-
abled Smith to accomplish what it did and the limitations of that ac-
complishment. My goal is to shed light on the conditions that enable 
and disable Supreme Court decisions from effectuating significant 
social change.9 
 Part II summarizes the Supreme Court’s three pre-Smith white 
primary decisions. Part III describes Smith’s legal and political back-
ground and also relates the post-Smith history of the white primary. 
Part IV, the core of the Article, describes the impact of Smith on 
Southern black voter registration. Relying principally on archival 
material mined from the NAACP Papers, I describe how Southern 
                                                                                                                    
ated the pace of racial change by crystallizing Southern white resistance, which led to vio-
lent confrontation followed by national intervention in the form of civil rights legislation). 
 6. Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. 
L. REV. 48, 77-88 (2000) [hereinafter Klarman, Criminal Procedure]; Michael J. Klarman, 
Is the Supreme Court Sometimes Irrelevant? Race and the Southern Criminal Justice Sys-
tem in the World War II Era, J. AM. HIST. (forthcoming 2002) [hereinafter Klarman, 
Southern Criminal Justice System]. 
 7. My claim in this Article is that the Court’s ruling in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 
649 (1944), had significant, direct, and immediate consequences for Southern black voter 
registration. I have argued elsewhere that legal scholars and historians should be more at-
tentive to the possibility that the process of litigation, wholly apart from whether it pro-
duced victories in court and whether those court victories translated into concrete changes 
in social practices, should be understood as an important facet of the early civil rights 
movement. Klarman, Criminal Procedure, supra note 6, at 88-92; Michael J. Klarman, 
Race and the Court in the Progressive Era, 51 VAND. L. REV. 881, 949-52 (1998) [hereinaf-
ter Klarman, Progressive Era]. Litigation educated Southern blacks about their rights, pro-
vided occasions for organizing local communities, displayed prominent black lawyers such 
as Charles Houston and Thurgood Marshall as role models for Southern blacks, and 
educated Northern whites (and Northern judges) about the egregiousness of Jim Crow 
conditions in the South. 
 8. 321 U.S. 649 (1944). 
 9. I regard this Article as supplementing, rather than refuting or even challenging, 
the claims made by Gerald Rosenberg in THE HOLLOW HOPE. Rosenberg explicitly ac-
knowledges that courts can produce social change under the right set of political and social 
conditions. ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 30-36. One of my objectives here is to explore the 
conditions under which litigation has proven conducive to social change. 
2001]                          WHITE PRIMARY 57 
 
blacks and whites responded to Smith and identify the political and 
social conditions that enabled Smith to launch a revolution in black 
political participation in the urban South. Part IV also examines the 
factors that largely nullified the impact of Smith in the rural South. 
A brief conclusion addresses the question of why the Supreme 
Court’s intervention in the white primary context was so much more 
immediately efficacious than its contemporaneous decisions involving 
criminal procedure issues affecting Southern blacks or its slightly 
later ruling in Brown. 
II.   THE PRE-SMITH WHITE PRIMARY CASES 
 The Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the white 
primary on three separate occasions prior to Smith v. Allwright.10 In 
1927, the Court in Nixon v. Herndon11 invalidated a Texas statute 
barring black participation in party primaries. This was by far the 
easiest of the three pre-Smith cases for the Court because state ac-
tion was unquestionably present. For many years prior to Herndon, 
the Court had interpreted both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments to forbid race discrimination only by the state and not 
by private entities.12 For a political party to exclude blacks from 
membership raised complicated questions regarding the scope of the 
state action requirement: Was a political party a public or a private 
entity? Were elections a public function for which the state was ap-
propriately held accountable? Could the state be deemed responsible 
for “inviting” a (private) political party to make racially discrimina-
tory membership decisions? No such complications existed in Hern-
don, however, because the Texas statute, not a party rule, barred 
black participation in party primaries. Justice Holmes, writing for 
the Court, saw this as an easy issue. In his two-page opinion, he 
declined to reach the Fifteenth Amendment question because “it 
                                                                                                                    
 10. Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); 
Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); see also Love v. Griffith, 266 U.S. 32, 34 (1924) (re-
jecting initial challenge to the Texas white primary on mootness grounds). For the most ex-
tensive treatment of the white primary litigation, see DARLENE CLARK HINE, BLACK 
VICTORY: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE WHITE PRIMARY IN TEXAS (1979). For other helpful 
treatments, see RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 137-39, 233-38 (1976); STEVEN 
F. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH 1944-1969, at 23-54 (1976); 
CHARLES S. MANGUM, JR., THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE NEGRO 405-24 (1940); BERNARD H. 
NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE NEGRO SINCE 1920, at 34-41, 85-106 
(1946); Robert Wendell Hainsworth, The Negro and the Texas Primaries, 18 J. NEGRO 
HIST. 426 (1933). 
 11. 273 U.S. 536 (1927). 
 12. E.g., James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 136 (1903) (Fifteenth Amendment); Civil 
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (Fourteenth Amendment). 
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seems to us hard to imagine a more direct and obvious infringement 
of the Fourteenth.”13 
 Yet Herndon was severely limited in its implications. The Texas 
white primary statute was the only one of its kind in the nation.14 In 
other Southern states, blacks were excluded from Democratic prima-
ries by party rule, not by state statute. Herndon did not necessarily 
have any implications for the constitutionality of these other permu-
tations of the white primary. Thus, the decision was a quintessential 
example of constitutional law’s proclivity for suppressing outliers.15 
 In its subsequent white primary cases, stretching from Nixon v. 
Condon16 in 1932 to Terry v. Adams17 in 1953, the Court had to con-
front the intractable state action issue. After Herndon, the Texas leg-
islature immediately enacted a law empowering the executive com-
mittee of political parties to prescribe qualifications for member-
ship.18 As anticipated and intended, the executive committee of the 
Texas State Democratic Party quickly passed a resolution excluding 
blacks from party membership.19 The issue in Condon was whether 
the state properly could be held responsible for the racially discrimi-
natory actions of the party. By the same five-to-four vote that fre-
quently divided the Justices along liberal/conservative lines on eco-
nomic issues in the 1930s,20 the Court in Condon found discrimina-
tory state action on the ground that the Texas legislature, rather 
than the State Democratic Party, had reposed authority in the party 
executive committee to prescribe membership qualifications.21 The 
majority declined to reach the question of whether a political party’s 
exclusion of blacks would qualify as state action in the absence of a 
                                                                                                                    
 13. Herndon, 273 U.S. at 541. 
 14. On the novelty and origins of the Texas statute, see HINE, supra note 10, at 47-49; 
LAWSON, supra note 10, at 24-25; NELSON, supra note 10, at 36-37; Leo Alilunas, Legal Re-
strictions on the Negro in Politics, 25 J. NEGRO HIST. 153, 167, 172-73 (1940); O. Douglas 
Weeks, The White Primary, 8 MISS. L.J. 135, 138 (1935). 
 15. On the notion that the Supreme Court’s constitutional rulings frequently involve 
suppression of outlier practice, see Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and 
Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 16-18 (1996); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking 
the History of American Freedom, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 265, 279 nn.60-65 (2000) (book 
review). On the notion that Jim Crow statutes frequently reflected rather than fostered 
Jim Crow norms, see Michael J. Klarman, The Plessy Era, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 303, 390-91, 
397-99, 401-02 (1998) [hereinafter Klarman, Plessy]. 
 16. 286 U.S. 73 (1932). 
 17. 345 U.S. 461 (1953). 
 18. HINE, supra note 10, at 109-11. 
 19. Condon, 286 U.S. at 82. 
 20. E.g., W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (minimum wage law); 
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (price regulation); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. 
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (mortgage moratorium). Barry Cushman has properly cau-
tioned against the casual use of political labels to describe the New Deal Justices. Barry 
Cushman, The Secret Lives of the Four Horsemen, 83 VA. L. REV. 559 (1997). 
 21. Condon, 286 U.S. at 88-89.  
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statute specifying which decisionmaking entity within the party was 
responsible for determining membership qualifications.22 
 Condon’s principal effect was to defer the more fundamental state 
action issue for an additional three years. The unresolved question 
was whether the Constitution prevented a political party from ex-
cluding blacks from membership when the state had not altered the 
party’s “natural” decisionmaking apparatus. Just three weeks after 
Condon, the annual convention of the Texas State Democratic Party 
passed a resolution barring blacks from membership.23 Condon’s ra-
tionale for invalidating the white primary had disappeared—the 
party had acted on its own, free from state influence over its deci-
sionmaking processes. The Court now had to confront directly the 
question of whether the state was constitutionally responsible for a 
political party’s independent decision to bar blacks from membership. 
In Grovey v. Townsend,24 the Justices unanimously declined to find 
state action under those circumstances. 
 Grovey is a confused and confusing opinion. Justice Roberts con-
ceded all the ways in which the state had regulated party prima-
ries.25 For example, Texas laws required that primary elections be 
held, that voter qualifications for general elections be applicable in 
primaries, that absentee voting be permitted, and that election 
judges enjoy certain specified powers.26 Justice Roberts identified two 
differences between primary and general elections that informed the 
Court’s determination that the exclusion of blacks from Democratic 
Party primaries was not state action: the state neither paid the ex-
penses of the primary, nor did it furnish or count the ballots.27 Lower 
court decisions considering the constitutionality of the white primary 
often had focused on these same factors.28 But neither Justice Rob-
erts nor these lower court judges satisfactorily explained why certain 
forms of state involvement in primary elections, but not others, con-
stituted the state action necessary to implicate the Fourteenth or Fif-
teenth Amendments. 
                                                                                                                    
 22. Id. at 83. 
 23. LAWSON, supra note 10, at 31.   
 24. 295 U.S. 45 (1935). 
 25. Id. at 49-53.  
 26. Id. at 49.  
 27. Id. at 50.  
 28. Nixon v. Condon, 34 F.2d 464 (W.D. Tex. 1929), aff’d, 49 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1931); 
West v. Bliley, 33 F.2d 177 (E.D. Va. 1929), aff’d, 42 F.2d 101 (4th Cir. 1930); Robinson v. 
Holman, 26 S.W.2d 66 (Ark. 1930); White v. Lubbock, 30 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930). 
For commentary on these lower court decisions, see Editorial, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, 
Apr. 3, 1935, at 8, reprinted in THE ATTITUDE OF THE SOUTHERN WHITE PRESS TOWARD 
NEGRO SUFFRAGE, 1932-1940, at 111 (Rayford W. Logan ed., 1940); HINE, supra note 10, 
ch. 5; PAUL LEWINSON, RACE, CLASS, AND PARTY: A HISTORY OF NEGRO SUFFRAGE AND 
WHITE POLITICS IN THE SOUTH 155-56 (1932); MANGUM, supra note 10, at 414-16; Weeks, 
supra note 14, at 144-45, 153. 
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 Herndon and Condon had little, if any, direct impact on black vot-
ing in the South because they were so easily circumvented. Herndon 
had no application outside of Texas, which was the only state to bar 
blacks from participating in party primaries by statute. Public reac-
tion to the decision in Texas was nonchalant because black exclusion 
from party primaries could be accomplished just as easily through 
party rule as by state statute.29 Similarly, Condon proved insignifi-
cant because it simply rerouted the decision to exclude blacks from 
the party’s executive committee to its annual state convention. It is 
difficult to comprehend why either ruling would have induced South-
ern state Democratic parties to permit blacks to participate in their 
primaries. 
 Grovey upheld the white primary when it was adopted by party 
convention, so obviously it did not lead to any increase in South-
ernern black political participation. Interestingly, neither did two 
lower court decisions in the early 1930s, which invalidated the white 
Democratic primaries of Virginia and Florida. In both of those states, 
the government paid for primary elections, unlike in Texas, where 
the party underwrote the expense. Two lower courts considered this 
difference dispositive and invalidated the white primaries in those 
states.30 Yet black voter registration increased very little in Virginia 
and Florida after these rulings, and in the rural counties of those 
states, officials completely ignored the decisions.31 Charles Hamilton 
Houston of the NAACP drew the lesson from these cases that suc-
cessful litigation accomplished little unless local communities were 
prepared to act upon favorable court rulings.32 Social and political 
conditions in the South were not yet ripe in the 1930s for mobilizing 
the African-American community for effective implementation of liti-
gation victories. Indeed, had these court decisions invalidating white 
primaries in Virginia and Florida had a more significant impact on 
black voter registration, state legislatures probably would have 
transferred financial responsibility for primary elections from the 
government to political parties in order to insulate the white primary 
from constitutional challenge. Because the rulings had such little 
consequence, nobody took steps to circumvent them. 
                                                                                                                    
 29. See, e.g., NELSON, supra note 10, at 39. On Herndon’s limited overall impact, see 
id. at 85-86. 
 30. Bliley v. West, 42 F.2d 101 (4th Cir. 1930); Goode v. Johnson, 149 So. 736 (Fla. 
1933). 
 31. On the limited impact of these decisions, see RALPH J. BUNCHE, THE POLITICAL 
STATUS OF THE NEGRO IN THE AGE OF FDR 442 (Dewey W. Grantham ed., 1973); HINE, su-
pra note 10, at 95-96, 101. But cf. LEWINSON, supra note 28, at 156 (noting that after the 
Fourth Circuit decision in Bliley, “there was a noticeable tendency, at least in the larger 
cities of Virginia, to admit Negroes to the State primaries . . . .”). 
 32. Alan Robert Burch, The NAACP Before and After Grovey v. Townsend 72-73 
(1994) (unpublished master’s thesis, University of Virginia) (on file with author). 
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III.   THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT OF SMITH V. ALLWRIGHT 
AND THE SUBSEQUENT HISTORY OF THE WHITE PRIMARY 
 Although Grovey v. Townsend was unanimous, the NAACP never 
regarded it as “completely fatal” and persisted in trying to persuade 
the Justices to reconsider their decision.33 Before the NAACP could 
carry another white primary case to the Court, however, an interven-
ing decision on a related issue raised hopes that the Justices might 
reconsider Grovey. United States v. Classic,34 decided in 1941, raised 
the question of whether the Federal Government had the constitu-
tional power to punish fraud in primary elections for national offices. 
Article I, section 4 of the Constitution empowers Congress to regulate 
“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and 
Representatives . . . .”35 In Newberry v. United States,36 decided in 
1921, a splintered Court had ruled that this constitutional provision 
did not authorize Congress to regulate primary elections for the 
United States Senate on the ground that primaries were not “Elec-
tions” within the meaning of Article I, section 4.37 In Classic, the 
Court overruled Newberry and sustained the Federal Government’s 
power to prosecute Louisiana election commissioners who had com-
mitted fraud during a primary election for a seat in the United 
States Congress. 
 The Court in Classic took care not to impeach the continuing va-
lidity of Grovey. The government brief in Classic distinguished 
Grovey, rather than asking the Court to overrule it, and Justice 
Stone’s majority opinion made no mention whatsoever of Grovey.38 
The two cases are indeed distinguishable, and in more than one way. 
First, Louisiana and Texas laws regulated party primaries differ-
ently, and thus it was possible to identify state action in one case 
without finding it in the other. Specifically, Louisiana law required 
that parties conduct primaries if they wanted their candidates to ap-
                                                                                                                    
 33. Letter from Charles H. Houston to R.D. Evans (Mar. 9, 1938), microformed on 
NAACP Papers, pt. IV, reel 3, fr. 366. Documents from the NAACP Papers, cited through-
out this Article, can be found in a Microfilm Edition at libraries across the United States. A 
permanent collection with a different numbering system also can be found at the Library of 
Congress’s Manuscript Division in Washington, D.C.  
 34. 313 U.S. 299 (1941). Classic is discussed in ROBERT K. CARR, FEDERAL 
PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS: QUEST FOR A SWORD 85-120 (1947); David M. Bixby, The 
Roosevelt Court, Democratic Ideology and Minority Rights: Another Look at United States 
v. Classic, 90 YALE L.J. 741, 792-815 (1981). 
 35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
 36. 256 U.S. 232 (1921). Newberry is discussed in Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle 
and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive Era, Part 3: Black Disfran-
chisement from the KKK to the Grandfather Clause, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 835, 887-98 (1982). 
 37. Newberry, 256 U.S. at 249-50.  
 38. For the government’s brief in Classic, see LAWSON, supra note 10, at 40. 
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pear on the general election ballot, while Texas law did not.39 Also, 
Louisiana paid the cost of party primaries,40 while Texas did not.41  
 Second, Grovey involved the question of whether party regulation 
of primaries constituted state action under the Fourteenth or Fif-
teenth Amendments, while Classic raised the issue of whether pri-
maries were “Elections” under Article I, section 4. These two ques-
tions need not yield the same answer. The Court had long held, for 
example, that under Article I, section 4, Congress could regulate in-
dividual action interfering with the right to vote in federal elec-
tions.42 Yet it had simultaneously denied Congress the power under 
the enforcement sections of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments to prohibit individual action interfering with the rights of 
blacks.43 Given that the Court had imposed a state action require-
ment for congressional regulation under the Reconstruction Amend-
ments but not under Article I, section 4, it was perfectly conceivable 
that the Justices would treat primary elections differently under 
these two constitutional provisions. Thus, Classic in no sense man-
dated the overthrow of Grovey. 
 On the other hand, much of the Court’s reasoning in Classic 
seemed directly relevant to the constitutionality of the white primary 
under the Reconstruction Amendments. In holding that a party pri-
mary was an “Election” under Article I, section 4, the Court empha-
sized a variety of factors that would seem equally relevant to the 
state action issue under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments:44 Louisiana paid the costs of the primary; state law required 
that party candidates on the general election ballot be selected 
through primaries; state law regulated the time, place, and manner 
of the primary election; and finally, as a practical matter, the pri-
mary election result determined the outcome of the general election 
in the one-party state of Louisiana. Lower courts and the Supreme 
Court previously had considered precisely the same sorts of factors in 
deciding whether party rules excluding blacks from primary elections 
amounted to unconstitutional state action under the Fourteenth or 
Fifteenth Amendments.45 Assuming that the factors enumerated in 
Classic would indeed prove relevant to the Court’s future determina-
tion of the constitutionality of white primaries under the Reconstruc-
tion Amendments, the critical question became how to interpret the 
following passage from Classic: Constitutional rights were implicated 
                                                                                                                    
 39. Classic, 313 U.S. at 312-13.  
 40. Id. at 311.  
 41. Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45, 50 (1935). 
 42. E.g., Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 661-62 (1884). 
 43. See supra note 12. 
 44. Classic, 313 U.S. at 318-20.  
 45. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
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in primary elections “[w]here the state law has made the primary an 
integral part of the procedure of choice, or where in fact the primary 
effectively controls the choice.”46 Throughout the one-party South in 
the 1940s, Democratic primaries “effectively control[led] the choice” 
at the general election. Yet different states regulated primaries dif-
ferently, and nobody could be certain what it meant for state law to 
make the primary “an integral part of the procedure of choice.”47 
 Many contemporary commentators were convinced that Classic 
had implications for the white primary,48 and Justice Harlan Fiske 
Stone later wrote that he had considered Grovey doomed from the 
moment he penned the majority opinion in Classic.49 NAACP lawyers 
were among those observers who were confident that the days of the 
white primary were numbered after Classic.50 Yet it surely would 
have been possible for the Justices to leave Grovey in place after 
Classic, had they been inclined to do so, either by distinguishing 
Texas law from Louisiana law or by distinguishing the Article I ques-
tion from that raised under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments. Lower court judges, for example, plainly did not believe that 
Grovey had been (silently) overruled by Classic.51 
 Just a couple of years later, however, the Justices granted certio-
rari in Smith v. Allwright to reconcile “a claimed inconsistency” be-
tween Grovey and Classic—an inconsistency that somehow had es-
caped their attention when they decided the latter.52 By an eight-to-
one vote, the Court overruled Grovey, observing, among other things, 
that the rule of stare decisis carries reduced weight in constitutional 
cases.53 Justice Reed’s majority opinion, noting that “[t]he party 
takes its character as a state agency from the duties imposed upon it 
by state statutes,”54 emphasized the multiplicity of ways in which 
Texas law regulated the state Democratic Party and its primaries—
for example, requiring that primary elections be held at particular 
                                                                                                                    
 46. Classic, 313 U.S. at 318. 
 47. On alternative ways to read Classic, see Bixby, supra note 34, at 803-05. 
 48. For contemporary predictions after Classic that the Court would overrule Grovey, 
see VIRGINIUS DABNEY, BELOW THE POTOMAC: A BOOK ABOUT THE NEW SOUTH 197 (1942); 
Fred G. Folsom, Jr., Federal Elections and the “White Primary”, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 1026, 
1027-28, 1033-35 (1943); see also Bixby, supra note 34, at 803-04 (noting that both contem-
porary commentators and the Justices seemed to appreciate the implications of Classic for 
the white primary issue). 
 49. Bixby, supra note 34, at 803-04. 
 50. See, e.g., HINE, supra note 10, at 205-07, 213-14 (describing the views of Thurgood 
Marshall and the NAACP). 
 51. See, e.g., Smith v. Allwright, 131 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1942) (per curiam) (affirming 
a lower court decision that had rejected a constitutional challenge to the Texas white pri-
mary, Classic notwithstanding). 
 52. 321 U.S. 649, 652 (1944). For background on Smith, see HINE, supra note 10, ch. 
10; LAWSON, supra note 10, ch. 2. 
 53. Smith, 321 U.S. at 665-66.  
 54. Id. at 663. 
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times, conducted in certain manners, and subjected to state over-
sight.55 The Court also emphasized what appeared to be a logically 
separate point: that primaries had “become a part of the machinery 
for choosing officials” and that Texas could not escape responsibility 
by “casting its electoral process in a form which permits a private or-
ganization to practice racial discrimination in the election.”56 These 
latter phrases raised the possibility that the Court might deem party 
primaries to be state action, regardless of how state law regulated 
them. 
 The shift from a nine-to-zero ruling in Grovey to an eight-to-one 
decision overruling it in Smith, within just a nine-year period, is un-
precedented in Supreme Court history. It is tempting to attribute 
this turnabout to President Roosevelt’s virtually complete recomposi-
tion of the Court during the intervening years. Only one Justice—
Harlan Fiske Stone—changed his mind in the interim. The only 
other surviving member of the Grovey Court was the decision’s au-
thor, Justice Owen Roberts. He penned a bitter dissent in Smith, la-
menting the Stone Court’s propensity for overruling precedents,57 
which “tends to bring adjudications of this tribunal into the same 
class as a restricted railroad ticket, good for this day and train 
only.”58 
 Focusing on the Court’s recomposition as the explanation for the 
result in Smith, though, misses something more fundamental—the 
significance of World War II. This is necessarily a point of specula-
tion because nothing in the Smith opinion or the surviving confer-
ence notes refers to the significance of the war. Still, the Justices 
cannot have failed to observe the tension between a purportedly de-
mocratic war fought against the Nazis, with their theories of Aryan 
supremacy, and the pervasive disfranchisement of Southern blacks. 
With black soldiers “dying just as same as the white,”59 the Justices 
must have felt tempted to do their part in ameliorating the hypocrisy 
of America’s democratic pretensions. As the New York Times approv-
ingly noted the day after Smith, the ruling put America “a little 
nearer to a more perfect democracy, in which there will be but one 
class of citizens . . . .”60 Around the same time as Smith, Congress de-
bated both a general repeal of the poll tax in federal elections and a 
more limited bill to suspend poll tax payments in federal elections for 
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members of the armed services.61 The same democratic ideology that 
inspired Congress to consider these measures probably influenced 
the Justices’ thinking about the white primary. The one decisive dif-
ference between Congress and the Court, however, was that the 
Southern Democrats’ stranglehold over the former (the Senate, spe-
cifically) did not extend to the latter. The bill to repeal the poll tax 
failed in the Senate at the same time the Court was interring the 
white primary.62 
 Another reason Smith may have proven a relatively easy decision 
for the Justices—if not as a matter of law, at least as a matter of pol-
icy—was that most Americans would have endorsed the result. The 
best evidence for this proposition involves Northern attitudes on an 
analogous issue—federal legislation to repeal the poll tax. The voting 
patterns of Northern congressmen suggest overwhelming support in 
Northern opinion for abolition of this other set of peculiarly Southern 
suffrage restrictions.63 There is no reason to think that most north-
erners would have felt differently about white primaries and poll 
taxes. Both of these suffrage restrictions applied only in seven or 
eight Southern states by the mid-1940s.64 Moreover, even Southern 
whites evinced significantly less commitment to preserving white po-
litical supremacy than, for example, to maintaining racial segrega-
tion in public education. That is, black disfranchisement ranked rela-
tively low on the hierarchy of white supremacist convictions.65 This 
may explain why Kentuckian Stanley Reed apparently had no 
qualms about writing the majority opinion in Smith, whereas in 
Brown v. Board of Education he planned to dissent until virtually 
the last minute.66 
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 Smith was not, as Thurgood Marshall claimed, “so clear and free 
of ambiguity” that it settled “once and for all” the right of blacks to 
participate in party primaries.67 To the contrary, ambiguity in the 
Smith opinion virtually invited efforts at circumvention.68 Specifi-
cally, to the extent that Smith turned on the fact that Texas law ex-
tensively regulated the state Democratic Party and its primaries, the 
Court’s ruling naturally led Southern states to consider deregulation 
as a response. South Carolina wasted no time.69 Within a fortnight of 
Smith, Governor Olin Johnston convened a special session of the 
state legislature and successfully urged the repeal of all 150 state 
statutes regulating political parties.70 Other Deep South states 
evinced considerable enthusiasm for following suit but instead 
adopted a wait-and-see posture as lower federal courts wrestled with 
South Carolina’s efforts to circumvent Smith.71 
 In 1947, in Elmore v. Rice,72 a South Carolina Federal District 
Judge, J. Waties Waring, ruled that the State Democratic Party’s ex-
clusion of blacks was unconstitutional state action, notwithstanding 
the legislature’s recent deregulation of the party. Under Classic, the 
constitutional ramifications of party primaries had turned on either 
of two factors—whether “state law has made the primary an integral 
part of the procedure of choice” or whether “in fact the primary effec-
tively controls the choice.”73 While legislative deregulation arguably 
had removed the former rationale for finding state action in the 
South Carolina Democratic Party’s exclusion of blacks, the latter 
consideration remained fully applicable.74 For example, in seven of 
the previous eight presidential elections, the Republican candidate 
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had won less than five percent of the popular vote in South Caro-
lina;75 thus, the Democratic Party primary clearly “control[led] the 
choice” at the general election. In his opinion invalidating the South 
Carolina Democratic Party’s exclusion of blacks, Judge Waring em-
phasized both the extent to which state law had regulated political 
parties prior to deregulation and the Democratic Party’s historical 
domination of election results in South Carolina.76 Waring considered 
it “pure sophistry” to suggest that the legislature’s deregulation ef-
forts had made any material difference to political realities in South 
Carolina, and he denied that “the skies will fall” if the State Democ-
ratic Party permitted blacks to participate in its primaries.77 Invok-
ing the Cold War imperative for racial change as a partial justifica-
tion for his ruling,78 Waring declared “[i]t is time for South Carolina 
to rejoin the Union.”79 The Fourth Circuit affirmed Judge Waring in a 
less flamboyant opinion.80 The Supreme Court, probably delighted to 
have Southern judges running interference on such a politically sen-
sitive racial issue, denied review.81 South Carolina’s efforts to evade 
Smith had “received a complete and shattering defeat.”82 Other Deep 
South states now abandoned consideration of the deregulation op-
tion.83 
 Yet even Elmore did not, as Marshall had hoped, nail down the lid 
in “the coffin of the white primary.”84 One more iteration of the white 
primary remained for the Court’s consideration. In Fort Bend 
County, Texas, the Jaybird Democratic Association had been exclud-
ing blacks from its pre-primary selection of candidates since 1889.85 
The Association, a political club consisting of all whites in the county, 
selected candidates for office who invariably became the Democratic 
Party nominees. Then, just as invariably, the nominees triumphed in 
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the general election. Other East Texas counties operated similar ex-
clusionary schemes, some dating back as far as the late 1870s.86 
While the Jaybirds did not create their Association to circumvent 
Smith and Elmore, they may just as well have, since it is easy to 
imagine the rest of the South following suit if the Court had sus-
tained the constitutionality of this scheme. The Justices thus had a 
strong incentive to invalidate the Jaybirds’ pre-primary. At confer-
ence, they evinced concern that “if this [scheme] is approved, it will 
be seized upon” and that to allow the Jaybirds’ pre-primary “would 
practically overturn the previous cases.”87 
 In Terry v. Adams,88 the Justices, by an eight-to-one vote, interred 
the Jaybirds’ “hateful little local scheme,” though some of them be-
lived that they sacrificed “sound principle[s] of interpretation” in do-
ing so.89 None of the rationales articulated by the three separate 
opinions in support of the conclusion that the Jaybirds’ scheme in-
volved the requisite state action for a constitutional violation was 
terribly persuasive.90 The principal difficulty for the Justices involved 
drawing a line between the Jaybirds’ discriminatory political scheme 
(which the Court ruled unconstitutional under the Fifteenth 
Amendment), and the discriminatory political preferences of private 
individuals (which not only fail to violate the Constitution, but 
actually receive affirmative protection under the First Amendment). 
The Court’s inability to articulate a principle distinguishing the un-
constitutional Jaybird pre-primary from constitutionally protected 
private discriminatory preferences led Justice Minton, the sole dis-
senter, to charge in a note to Justice Jackson that “[w]hen the Jay-
bird opinion comes down, there may be some question as to which 
election returns the Court follows! It will be damn clear they aren’t 
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following any law.”91 In the same year that they pondered the invali-
dation of racial segregation in public education, the Justices dis-
played an unwillingness to legitimize a Southern community’s 
scheme for disfranchising blacks, regardless of how strained the con-
stitutional rationale for invalidating it. 
IV.   THE CONSEQUENCES OF SMITH V. ALLWRIGHT 
 In 1940, just three percent of eligible Southern blacks were regis-
tered to vote, but by 1952 twenty percent were.92 Some of that in-
crease preceded Smith and therefore must be attributed to various 
factors associated with World War II, rather than to the Court’s in-
tervention.93 Nor can one attribute all of the post-1944 increase in 
Southern black voter registration to Smith. Yet the Court’s invalida-
tion of the white primary contributed significantly to the dramatic 
increase in Southern black voter registration that took place in the 
middle and late 1940s. Why Smith should have had this effect is an 
interesting question, given that lower court decisions in the early 
1930s invalidating the white primaries of Virginia and Florida did 
not.94 
 Numerous changes in the Southern social and political climate 
enabled Smith to have such a notable impact. The most important of 
these were the following: an increased willingness among white 
Southerners to tolerate black political participation; the greater as-
sertiveness of Southern blacks in demanding their rights; the prolif-
eration of NAACP branches in the South, which facilitated legal chal-
lenges to efforts at nullifying Smith; an increased threat of Justice 
Department prosecution of persons continuing to obstruct black suf-
frage; and the unprecedented willingness of Southern judges to gen-
erously construe black voting rights. Together, these factors created 
an environment in which the Court’s invalidation of the white pri-
mary launched a political revolution in the urban South. Without 
these propitious background circumstances, Smith likely would have 
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been almost as inconsequential as earlier voting rights decisions, 
such as Guinn v. United States95 and Nixon v. Herndon.96 Each of 
these factors warrants a closer look, though first we should consider 
briefly the immediate impact of Smith on the South. 
 In states like Tennessee and North Carolina, which never had 
conducted statewide white primaries, and Virginia, where federal 
courts had invalidated the white primary over a decade earlier, white 
reaction to Smith proved mostly calm and collected.97 The two lead-
ing Richmond newspapers, for example, endorsed the ruling. One of 
them observed that blacks had voted in Virginia’s Democratic prima-
ries for years, yet “the skies haven’t fallen.”98 Moreover, in Arkansas 
and Texas—states which had barred black participation in Democ-
ratic primaries prior to Smith—many counties immediately disman-
tled racial barriers after the Court’s ruling.99 In the Deep South, 
however, Democratic Party officials and officeholders pledged resis-
tance. Party committees in Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, Ala-
bama, Louisiana, and Mississippi resolved to maintain their racial 
exclusivity, and blacks in those states generally were not permitted 
to vote in primaries in the spring and summer of 1944.100 That year, 
only an estimated 200,000 Southern blacks were registered to vote, 
overwhelmingly as Republicans.101 
 Within just a couple of years, however, huge changes took place. 
Blacks participated in large numbers in Democratic primaries in 
Georgia, Florida, and Texas by 1946, in Louisiana and South Caro-
lina by 1948, and even in Mississippi by 1950. The number of South-
ern blacks registered to vote rose to between 700,000 and 800,000 by 
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1948 and then to one million by 1952.102 Georgia experienced the 
quickest and most startling transformation—black voter registration 
increased from roughly 20,000 in 1940 to 125,000 in 1947.103 In South 
Carolina, where essentially no blacks were permitted to vote in De-
mocratic primaries in 1946, an estimated 35,000 participated in 
1948.104 That same year, the number of registered black voters in 
Louisiana increased from 8,000 to 43,000 within an eight-month pe-
riod; by 1952, the number had grown to 107,000.105 In Florida, the 
number of registered black voters increased from 49,000 in 1947 to 
116,000 in 1950.106 Even in Mississippi, where resistance to black suf-
frage remained intense, black voter registration rose from 2,500 in 
1946 to 20,000 in 1950.107 
 Based on this stunning increase in Southern black voter registra-
tion, the NAACP proclaimed Smith “a giant milestone in the pro-
gress of Negro Americans toward full citizenship.”108 Without Smith, 
these changes probably would not have taken place when they did.109 
But even with Smith, other supportive conditions were necessary to 
accomplish this “first real break-through since 1900 in the rights of 
the Negro people to exercise the franchise.”110 One important change 
that had taken place between Grovey in 1935 and Smith in 1944 was 
the greater receptivity of Southern whites to black political participa-
tion. One should not overstate the point; many whites, especially in 
the Deep South, remained bitterly opposed to black suffrage with its 
historical connotations of “Negro domination.” Yet by 1944, that reac-
tionary perspective faced new competition. Many Southern white 
newspapers, especially but not exclusively in the peripheral South, 
endorsed Smith on the ground that blacks should receive “their fair 
and just political . . . rights.”111 An editorial appearing in the white 
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newspapers of Columbus and Macon, Georgia, which advocated com-
pliance with Smith, elicited surprising statements of support for the 
author, rather than the anticipated harassing midnight phone 
calls.112 When Deep South states adopted evasive measures after 
Smith to impede black political participation, many white newspa-
pers voiced opposition.113 When Alabamians voted in 1946 on whether 
to change their constitution to empower registrars to administer 
vaguely worded literacy tests designed to bar black voter registra-
tion—the so-called Boswell amendment—only a bare majority of 
whites (fifty-four percent) supported the measure.114 
 Some progressive white Southerners, including those supporting 
organized labor’s concurrent efforts to unionize the South, calculated 
that black enfranchisement probably would benefit liberal politi-
cians.115 Economically populist and racially moderate governors, like 
Earl Long of Louisiana and Big Jim Folsom of Alabama, not only tol-
erated, but actively supported, the surge in black voter registration 
that followed Smith.116 Folsom campaigned against the Boswell 
amendment in 1946, and as governor, urged blacks who had been un-
fairly denied registration to sue local officials who proved beyond the 
governor’s political control.117 The white political establishment in At-
lanta apparently also endorsed black suffrage, as Fulton County reg-
istrars in 1948 not only permitted blacks to register, but actually set 
up shop in black schools and churches to facilitate their enroll-
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ment.118 Even in South Carolina, some white Democrats struggled to 
open their party to blacks, reasoning that a great many black citizens 
were “now qualified in mind and character to take part in our form of 
government,”119 that black soldiers were doing their part in a war 
fought for democratic ends, and that black enfranchisement would 
help convince minority peoples around the world that American de-
mocracy protected human rights without regard to race.120 
 Many ordinary white citizens, lacking in any particular political 
incentive, tolerated or even supported black suffrage because they 
could not see how to justify continued disfranchisement in a democ-
ratic age. Novel schemes to impede black suffrage were, in the words 
of one white newspaper, an effort “to turn the clock back, a failure to 
face up to facts.”121 One white South Carolina Democrat wrote to 
Thurgood Marshall to distance himself from his party’s continuing ef-
forts to exclude blacks, which he believed “profan[ed] the Bill of 
Rights.”122 A white Alabama Democrat criticized her party’s contin-
ued proscription of blacks as a “cruel and a shameful thing.”123 Other 
Southern whites shared the view that “[m]en who faced bullets over-
seas deserve ballots at home” and that black disfranchisement re-
flected “the [same] hateful ideologies” that the country had been 
fighting against in World War II.124 
 Another critical change in circumstance that enabled more effec-
tive enforcement of Smith was the greater capacity of Southern 
blacks by 1944 to capitalize on a favorable Court decision. Earlier 
civil rights victories in the Supreme Court had entailed few practical 
consequences, partly because the African-American community had 
been unable to mobilize behind their enforcement.125 Smith was a 
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highly salient event for Southern blacks, and they quickly seized 
upon it as the occasion for registering to vote and demanding access 
to Democratic primaries.126 Thousands of returning World War II 
veterans took their release papers that entitled them to exemption 
from the poll tax, headed off to city hall, and demanded that they be 
registered to vote.127 Many expressed the conviction that “[a]fter hav-
ing been overseas fighting for democracy, . . . when we got back here 
we should enjoy a little of it.”128 Non-veterans also sought to register 
in large numbers after Smith.129 Across the South, blacks established 
progressive voters’ leagues, which conducted voter education classes 
to enable registrants to pass literacy tests and organized campaigns 
to encourage blacks to vote.130 Record numbers of Southern blacks at-
tempted to vote in Democratic primaries during 1944, notwithstand-
ing public statements by party officials that blacks would remain 
barred.131 Many of those blacks rejected at the polls filed affidavits 
recording their experiences with the NAACP and the Justice De-
partment.132 
 The proliferation of lawsuits challenging continued exclusion of 
blacks from Democratic primaries also evidenced the greater 
assertiveness of Southern blacks during and after World War II. 
Blacks brought such suits in Georgia in 1944, Florida in 1944-45, and 
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South Carolina in 1947,133 and threatened many additional suits 
against recalcitrant party officials who continued to ignore Smith.134 
Blacks in some Southern locales became so enthusiastic to sue that 
efforts by the NAACP’s national office to coordinate litigation strat-
egy went for naught. Thurgood Marshall and the national legal staff 
preferred to defer civil damages suits until after the Justice Depart-
ment had decided whether to bring criminal prosecutions for viola-
tions of Smith.135 Yet before the national office could communicate its 
preferences, the branch in Columbus, Georgia, already had proceeded 
too far down the litigation path to change course. The branch presi-
dent explained to the NAACP that “the people demanded that we 
continue the case.”136 The branch in Jackson, Mississippi, likewise 
showed reluctance to accede to the national office’s preference for 
postponing civil litigation, because many members “are becoming 
impatient . . . and we are anxious to try to do something.”137 Six 
months later, the branch president reminded Marshall that members 
“are very anxious to go to the courts with the case.”138 Blacks seeking 
to vote in the South Carolina Democratic primary in 1946 similarly 
were “expecting great things and are looking for a suit.”139 
 Blacks responded to Smith by initiating another sort of litigation 
as well. Because Smith (theoretically) had opened Democratic prima-
ries to blacks, their right to vote finally had acquired some practical 
value in the one-party South. Southern blacks now demanded that 
they be registered to vote without regard to race and sued registrars 
who continued to discriminate. By the second half of 1945, blacks had 
brought such suits against registrars in Birmingham and Tuskegee, 
Alabama; Jacksonville and Titusville, Florida; St. John the Baptist 
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Parish, Louisiana; and Atlanta.140 Many more blacks besieged regis-
tration boards with letters threatening lawsuits if discriminatory 
registration practices continued.141 When the registrar in Lake 
Charles, Louisiana, denied enrollment to black applicants through a 
variety of unlawful stratagems, they consulted a lawyer who 
promptly telephoned the registrar to threaten him with legal ac-
tion.142 Louisiana blacks were “bursting with anxiety to knock out” 
discriminatory registration practices.143 
 This propensity toward litigation partly was attributable to the 
greater black militancy spawned by World War II. Yet two other de-
velopments traceable mainly to the war also facilitated broader liti-
gation: the spread of NAACP branches into more remote parts of the 
South and the improved economic status of blacks generally.144 
NAACP membership grew from roughly 50,000 in 1940 to 450,000 in 
1946, and the number of branches rose from 355 to 1,073.145 In one of 
the region’s most racially recalcitrant states, South Carolina, NAACP 
membership grew from roughly 800 in 1939 to 14,000 in 1948.146 
More NAACP branches meant that more Southern communities were 
able to support litigation against defiant public and party officials. 
NAACP branches communicated valuable information regarding lo-
cal voting practices to one another, often through the national office 
or the state conference of branches.147 Blacks in one community be-
came more determined to vote after discovering that blacks else-
where in their state had become enfranchised. Increased NAACP 
membership also translated into a larger legal budget, which meant 
that the national office finally could hire several lawyers to supple-
ment Thurgood Marshall’s heroic efforts. In the early 1940s, the New 
York office often had been too swamped to provide much assistance 
                                                                                                                    
 140. See Hall v. Nagel, 154 F.2d 931 (5th Cir. 1946); Mitchell v. Wright, 154 F.2d 924 
(5th Cir. 1946); Along the NAACP Battlefront, 52 THE CRISIS 231 (Aug. 1945); NAACP Files 
New Vote Registration Case in Alabama (June 21, 1945), microformed on NAACP Papers, 
pt. IV, reel 6, fr. 151; Letter from Harry T. Moore to Thurgood Marshall (Apr. 23, 1946), id. 
pt. IV, reel 7, fr. 365; Letter from Thurgood Marshall to Francis J. Biddle (Oct. 3, 1944), id. 
pt. IV, reel 8, frs. 433-34. 
 141. See, e.g., Legal Redress Committee, supra note 129, at frs. 76-77; Letter from E.K. 
McIlrath to Jacksonville City Commissioners (May 3, 1945), microformed on NAACP Pa-
pers, pt. IV, reel 7, frs. 22-23; Letter from Daniel E. Byrd to Jackson Parish Registrar of 
Voters (Oct. 21, 1947), id. pt. IV, reel 8, frs. 518-19.  
 142. A.P. Tureaud memorandum on Registrars’ Practices in Various La. Parishes 
(Sept. 1, 1944), id. pt. IV, reel 8, frs. 407-10 [hereinafter Tureaud memorandum]. 
 143. Id. at fr. 410.  
 144. On the spread of NAACP branches, see Editorial, 5 Million Voters by 1950—A 
Laudable Objective, SHREVEPORT SUN (Apr. 30, 1949), microformed on NAACP Papers, pt. 
IV, reel 7, fr. 563. 
 145. RICHARD M. DALFIUME, DESEGREGATION OF THE U.S. ARMED FORCES: FIGHTING 
ON TWO FRONTS, 1939-53, at 123 (1969). 
 146. BARTLEY, supra note 102, at 29. 
 147. See, e.g., Letter from William Henry Samuel to NAACP (Sept. 7, 1948), 
microformed on NAACP Papers, pt. IV, reel 8, fr. 600. 
2001]                          WHITE PRIMARY 77 
 
to Southern branches in litigating voting cases.148 After the war, an 
expanded legal staff was better able to provide advice and actual 
lawyering in support of the voting rights campaign. 
 Larger branch memberships and more prosperous members trans-
lated into more money available to hire lawyers. The president of the 
Shreveport branch, seeking advice from the national office about how 
best to compel registrars to enroll blacks, announced that his branch 
was “ready with finances for anything.”149 The branch in Jackson, 
Mississippi, eager to litigate against continuing exclusion of blacks 
from Democratic primaries, assured the national office of its ability 
to finance the litigation by itself.150 In addition, more Southern white 
lawyers were now willing to take voting rights cases, given diminish-
ing resistance among whites to black suffrage.151 More black lawyers 
also practiced in the South by the mid-1940s, which proved helpful 
whenever doubts remained as to the willingness of particular white 
lawyers to exert themselves sufficiently on behalf of black suffrage.152 
 The threat of litigation challenging the discriminatory admini-
stration of voter registration requirements or the exclusion of blacks 
from Democratic primaries provided public and party officials with a 
direct incentive to comply with the Constitution. While these officials 
overwhelmingly preferred that blacks not vote, they did not wish to 
incur personal liability for violating black voting rights. With threats 
of litigation flying from all directions, these officials began to comply 
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with the law. In Spalding County, Georgia, local officials had little 
choice but to register black voters without discrimination, after Fed-
eral Judge Frank Scarlett ordered them to do so and then held the 
case open pending further complaint.153 Local registration officials in 
several South Carolina counties, fearing federal court litigation, de-
fied orders from the state Democratic Party by registering black vot-
ers.154 After Judge Waring in 1947 and 1948 invalidated efforts by 
the South Carolina Democratic Party to evade Smith and threatened 
to hold party officials in contempt, 35,000 blacks were enrolled on 
party membership books.155 In Washington Parish, Louisiana, blacks 
had been denied registration until they formed an NAACP branch 
and filed suit before a sympathetic federal judge, J. Skelly Wright, 
who enjoined the registrar from further race discrimination.156 As a 
result of this litigation, Washington Parish registered its first black 
voter in 1950. That precedent inspired federal lawsuits in several 
other Louisiana parishes, which induced registrars to enroll blacks 
rather than risk personal liability.157 
 By the mid-1940s, damages suits were not all that recalcitrant of-
ficials had to fear; criminal prosecution by the Federal Government 
now became a distinct possibility. Southern NAACP branch officials 
constantly reminded public and party officers that willful violations 
of black voting rights qualified for federal prosecution under civil 
rights statutes.158 Indeed, the Justice Department already had 
prosecuted a few registrars for discriminatory practices—one in 
North Carolina in the mid-1930s and two others in the Carolinas in 
the early 1940s.159 One important consequence of burgeoning black 
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political power was that Justice Department officials became more 
solicitous of the voting rights of Southern blacks. The Department 
repeatedly invited Thurgood Marshall to Washington, D.C., to dis-
cuss voting issues, and assured Southern NAACP officials that their 
voting rights complaints were receiving thorough investigation.160 By 
way of contrast, the Justice Department in the mid-1930s generally 
had manifested indifference toward the voting rights protests of 
Southern blacks. Back then, United States attorneys merely went 
through the motions of investigating complaints and were as likely to 
intimidate black victims as to prosecute their cases.161 
 Immediately after Smith, Thurgood Marshall wrote to Attorney 
General Francis Biddle, requesting that the government instruct 
United States attorneys to prosecute party officials who continued to 
exclude blacks from primary elections.162 NAACP lawyers bombarded 
Justice Department officials with affidavits from Southern blacks at-
testing to persistent violations of black voting rights and demands for 
criminal prosecutions.163 One NAACP officer in Birmingham, Ala-
bama, bragged that he was sending “a bag of evidence almost daily” 
to the Justice Department.164 By the fall of 1944, Marshall was in 
regular conference with Department lawyers, including the Attorney 
General, negotiating over when and where the government would 
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commence prosecutions.165 In early 1945, the New York Times re-
ported that Department officials were contemplating immediate 
prosecutions in three Southern states.166 A year later, the Depart-
ment issued a policy statement declaring that it would prosecute any 
public or party official attempting to interfere with black voting 
rights.167 
 Notwithstanding its bold pronouncements, the Justice Depart-
ment remained reluctant to prosecute voting rights cases. However, 
it did launch investigations and dispatch FBI agents to Southern 
communities to gather information, thus offering food for thought to 
Southern officials contemplating interference with black voting 
rights. Birmingham lawyer Arthur Shores reported to Marshall that 
a personal visit from the United States Attorney to the local board of 
registrars “had a very wholesome effect on helping us get . . . a large 
number [of black voters] registered.”168 Harry Moore, founder of the 
Florida Progressive Voters’ League, believed that a federal investiga-
tion of the incident in Greensboro, Florida, in which two black broth-
ers were attacked and then run out of town in retaliation for their 
voter registration activities would have “a healthy effect in all of 
those counties, where Negroes have been kept from the polls through 
intimidation.”169 One of these brothers later reported that the FBI’s 
appearance in Greensboro had the “crack[er]s . . . looking very sick    
. . . .”170 Moreover, a heightened federal law enforcement presence in 
the South, even if it did not result in actual prosecutions, provided 
some modicum of security to Southern blacks who risked their physi-
cal safety by challenging the political status quo. Donald Jones, 
Southwest Regional Secretary of the NAACP, warned the chairman 
of the Caddo Parish (Louisiana) Democratic Executive Committee 
that he risked criminal prosecution for supporting the continued ex-
clusion of blacks from party primaries. Jones then quickly reminded 
Thurgood Marshall to mention this case to the Justice Department, 
because “I threatened the gentleman and don’t want to be caught 
with my breeches at half mast.”171 
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 Even apart from the greater presence of the Federal Government, 
the South was a safer place for blacks by the mid-1940s than it had 
been even a decade earlier—a change in circumstance that surely 
contributed to the greater aggressiveness with which blacks de-
manded their constitutional rights. It is important, however, not to 
overstate the point. Southern whites lynched blacks with somewhat 
greater frequency during and after the War than immediately be-
fore,172 and Thurgood Marshall himself barely escaped with his life 
while defending criminal cases arising from the Columbia, Tennes-
see, race riot in 1946.173 Yet the South had become a relatively safer 
place for blacks, owing to the same forces that were gradually eradi-
cating lynchings—urbanization, industrialization, better education, 
less insularity, and the threat of federal anti-lynching legislation and 
criminal prosecution for civil rights violations.174 The greater physical 
security enjoyed by Southern blacks was vitally important to the vot-
ing rights campaign launched after Smith, as well as to the direct ac-
tion protests of the early 1960s. 
 Some quick comparisons between interwar and postwar Southern 
social conditions illustrates this point. In Jacksonville, Florida, a Ku 
Klux Klan (KKK) demonstration on election eve, 1920, drew a thou-
sand participants and deterred nearly all blacks in the city from vot-
ing.175 That same year, as many as fifty blacks died in election riots 
in Ocoee, Florida.176 Fearing for their safety, black witnesses to the 
riot declined to testify before an investigating committee in Washing-
ton, D.C. In 1932, police officers in Shreveport, Louisiana, armed 
with machine guns, suppressed an effort by local blacks to organize a 
voters league. City authorities warned that the streets would be 
drenched with blood before they would permit blacks to vote, and a 
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black newspaper editor who had helped organize the campaign was 
forced to leave town under threat to his life.177 Similarly, a black man 
who challenged Mississippi’s white primary in 1927 had his life 
threatened and then was run out of town.178 Whites lynched an aver-
age of just under fifty Southern blacks annually in the first half of 
the 1920s and just under twenty in the first half of the 1930s.179 
 Much had changed by the mid-1940s. The KKK was in a weaker 
position from which to intimidate black voters because it was busy 
defending itself from state efforts to revoke its charter and federal ef-
forts to prosecute its leaders for tax evasion.180 Hundreds of blacks 
flocked to the Senate committee hearings investigating Senator 
Theodore Bilbo’s incitement of whites to violence against blacks in 
Mississippi’s 1946 senatorial primary—hearings that were held not 
in the relative safety of Washington, D.C., but in Jackson, Missis-
sippi.181 In postwar Louisiana, tens of thousands of blacks registered 
to vote, even in some rural parishes, with the active support of Gov-
ernor Long and under the protective eye of the federal courts and the 
Justice Department.182 In the mid-1940s, blacks across the Deep 
South filed lawsuits challenging denials of voting rights without en-
countering significant threats of physical violence, although they 
continued to suffer economic retaliation.183 While the annual number 
of Southern lynchings had increased briefly during the immediate 
postwar years, it quickly declined again to near zero by the late 
1940s.184 The Federal Government aggressively investigated and 
prosecuted the few lynchings that did occur during and after the 
War.185 Blacks attempting to vote in the rural Deep South in the mid-
1940s were still likely to face physical intimidation, but far more of-
ten in the form of a beating than a lynching.186 Of course, one does 
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not want to minimize this threat of physical violence. The postwar 
Deep South remained a dangerous place for blacks intent on exercis-
ing their constitutional rights, but the degree of danger had subsided 
somewhat, thereby enabling Southern blacks to demand their rights 
without ordinarily putting their lives on the line.187 
 Another important factor contributing to the momentous South-
ern black voter registration of the 1940s was the willingness of lower 
court judges to embrace generous interpretations of Smith and the 
Fifteenth Amendment. Again, the contrast with the 1930s is reveal-
ing. Black lawyers arguing the Texas white primary cases before the 
Fifth Circuit in the early 1930s faced “insult[ing]” judges who liter-
ally turned their backs on the lawyers during oral argument.188 In 
correspondence with the NAACP national office, these lawyers re-
peatedly doubted whether “Southern Judge[s]” ever would vindicate 
the voting rights claims of black litigants and wondered whether it 
was worth even bothering to show up for oral argument in the Fifth 
Circuit, since only a Supreme Court appeal held any promise of suc-
cess.189  
 The voting rights decisions of Southern judges in the 1930s con-
firmed these doubts. Judges strained to find technicalities upon 
which to reject voting rights claims and manifested a willful blind-
ness to the racially discriminatory administration of facially neutral 
voter qualifications.190 Postwar judges, by way of contrast, often 
proved more accommodating to blacks litigating voting rights issues. 
This conversion among lower court judges proved crucial to the suc-
cess of Southern black voter registration because public and party of-
ficials contrived a multitude of evasive techniques to impede black 
suffrage after Smith. Repeated appeals to the Supreme Court were 
expensive, and the Justices lacked the resources to hear every case 
alleging evasion of earlier decisions. Thus the receptivity of lower 
court judges was critical to the effective implementation of Smith. 
 As noted earlier, many Southern whites, with varying degrees of 
enthusiasm, were prepared to accept black suffrage by the mid-
1940s.191 Yet most Southern politicians and the public officers they 
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appointed were not. This is probably no great surprise. Politicians 
generally are unenthusiasiastic about electoral change, given their 
vested interest in preserving the system that elected them to office.192 
Whatever their motives, however, Democratic politicians, party offi-
cials, and voter registrars throughout much of the South responded 
to Smith with defiance and evasion as they endeavored to prevent 
the Court from “revolutioniz[ing] our Southern customs and dis-
rupt[ing] our peaceable existence.”193 
 In most Southern states, the Democratic Party continued to ex-
clude blacks from primaries for at least a year or two after Smith.194 
Sometimes, they embraced this position with open defiance.195 The 
chairman of the Mississippi Democratic Party Executive Committee, 
for example, declared that “the Supreme Court or no one else can 
control a Democratic primary in Mississippi.”196 In other states, how-
ever, party officials rightly noted that Smith did not necessarily in-
validate all white primaries.197 The Court’s ruling partially relied on 
how Texas law regulated parties and their primaries; other states 
regulated parties and primaries differently. For example, while 
Texas law required parties to conduct primaries, Georgia law did not. 
Even more importantly, to the extent that Smith had turned on the 
fact of state regulation of political parties, it might be possible to 
avoid the decision entirely by repealing all statutes regulating par-
ties. South Carolina did exactly this after Smith, and other states 
contemplated following suit, waiting to see how lower courts evalu-
ated the constitutionality of South Carolina’s efforts.198 
 Lower courts generally refused to countenance such evasions. The 
Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court ruling rejecting proffered dis-
tinctions between Georgia’s white primary and the Texas variant in-
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validated in Smith.199 The Florida Supreme Court ruled similarly.200 
Perhaps more significantly, Judge Waring sternly repudiated South 
Carolina’s effort to evade Smith by repealing all legal regulation of 
the Democratic Party, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed him.201 These 
decisions involved more than simple applications of Smith; they re-
quired extensions. The Fifth Circuit, for example, explicitly noted 
that Smith and Classic were not dispositive of the constitutionality of 
Georgia’s white primary because of relevant differences in the ways 
that Texas and Louisiana had regulated political parties. Yet that 
court nonetheless concluded that the Georgia Democratic Party’s ex-
clusion of blacks violated the Constitution. Lower court judges more 
antagonistic toward black voting rights could have found ways to re-
solve these cases differently. Judge Waring, however, decided that 
“[i]t is time for South Carolina to rejoin the Union.”202 When party of-
ficials responded to Waring’s ruling by adopting a dual membership 
status based on race and a party loyalty oath designed to offend most 
prospective black members (including a requirement of swearing 
support for segregation), an enraged Waring enjoined these evasive 
efforts, and the Fourth Circuit again affirmed him.203 
 Some Southern states in the late 1940s adopted measures to ob-
struct black voter registration. With Democratic primaries now 
(theoretically) open to blacks, tougher registration procedures and 
requirements became a favored alternative method for impeding 
black suffrage. For example, Alabama voters enacted the Boswell 
amendment, requiring that registrants “understand and explain” a 
section of the United States Constitution, not just read it, and also 
understand “the duties and obligations of good citizenship.”204 Propo-
nents of the amendment did not disguise their intention to confer 
broad discretion on registrars for the purpose of preserving white po-
litical supremacy. Georgia likewise adopted a tougher voter registra-
tion requirement after Smith, though the state tried to avoid the le-
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gal pitfalls of the Boswell amendment by somewhat constraining the 
discretion delegated to registrars.205 
 With or without statutory authorization, Southern voter regis-
trars employed a wide variety of stratagems for impeding black suf-
frage.206 Sometimes, registration boards simply closed to prevent 
blacks from registering. Other times, registrars enrolled voters at 
undisclosed times in secret locations (contrary to statutory require-
ments). White registrants discovered through word of mouth where 
and when to show up, while blacks were kept in the dark. When 
blacks did locate registrars, they often were forced to wait in line for 
hours, so that only a few at a time could enroll. Registrars required 
blacks to complete their own registration forms and then flunked 
them for trivial errors, while registrars themselves filled out the 
forms for whites. Registrars asked blacks, but not whites, to recite 
from memory the entire United States Constitution or to answer im-
possible (and obviously insulting) questions, such as “how many bub-
bles are in a bar of soap?” Registrars required blacks, but not whites, 
to produce already registered voters—and sometimes only whites 
would suffice—to vouch for information on their application forms. 
Some registrars did not bother even to indulge in any pretense of le-
gality; they simply told blacks that they would not be registered re-
gardless of their qualifications. Individual registrars often acted as a 
law unto themselves, ignoring even specific instructions from state 
officials to treat black registrants fairly.207 Thus, registration prac-
tices often varied dramatically between different parts of a state or 
even a city. 
 For the first time in Southern history, lower courts began ruling 
such behavior unconstitutional. A three-judge district court consist-
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ing entirely of Southerners invalidated the Boswell amendment on 
the ground that it delegated to registrars unconstitutionally broad 
discretion, which had been administered in a racially discriminatory 
fashion.208 The court also noted the obviously discriminatory purpose 
that had animated the amendment.209 The court’s refusal to counte-
nance a broad delegation, as well as its willingness to investigate leg-
islative motive, were in tension with the Supreme Court’s earlier, 
more lenient approach toward black disfranchisement.210 Other 
Southern judges likewise began to enjoin registrars from applying 
voter registration requirements and procedures in racially discrimi-
natory ways.211 These courts suspended their customary presump-
tions that public officials had discharged their legal duties in good 
faith. When registrars in approximately thirty Georgia counties be-
gan purging black voters from the books at the behest of former Gov-
ernor Eugene Talmadge, a federal judge quickly enjoined them from 
doing so.212 On a somewhat different issue, the Arkansas Supreme 
Court invalidated a state law designed to meet the challenge of 
Smith by separating state and federal elections (both primary and 
general), barring race discrimination only in the federal ones, and 
therefore implicitly allowing continued exclusion of blacks from state 
primaries.213 
 The willingness of lower court judges to follow the spirit rather 
than the letter of Smith and to interpret the Fifteenth Amendment to 
bar discriminatory voter registration practices that had been toler-
ated for decades was a necessary condition for the postwar surge in 
Southern black voter registration. Democratic officials in Georgia 
and Florida did not allow blacks to participate in primary elections 
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until lower courts had ruled Smith applicable to those states’ prima-
ries.214 Blacks did not participate in significant numbers in South 
Carolina primaries until Judge Waring’s rulings in Elmore v. Rice 
and Brown v. Baskin. Waring threatened to hold party officials in 
contempt if they continued to bar black participation after he had 
made it clear, “once and for all, . . . that they [would] be required to 
obey and carry out the orders of this court, not only in the technical 
respects but in the true spirit and meaning of the same.”215 After 
Waring’s rulings, 35,000 South Carolina blacks turned out to vote in 
Democratic primaries during the summer of 1948.216 In Louisiana, 
two federal court decisions from the early 1950s, enjoining registrars 
from discriminatory applications of voter registration requirements, 
opened the floodgates to a massive black voter registration.217 
 These lower court rulings, to repeat, were not ineluctable applica-
tions of existing precedent. The judges who decided these cases chose 
to extend Smith and to go beyond existing interpretations of the Fif-
teenth Amendment. As one contemporary commentator observed, 
these decisions adopted “broad and discerning” rather than “narrow 
and literal” interpretations of black voting rights, nullifying the re-
peated efforts of white Southerners to “find the magic combination of 
ambiguous wording, legalisms, and technicalities which will allow 
them to ‘make possible the impossible.’”218 These judges took seri-
ously the Supreme Court’s admonitions in Classic that the Constitu-
tion is “not to be read with such stultifying narrowness”219 and in 
Lane v. Wilson that the Fifteenth Amendment “nullifies sophisti-
cated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimination.”220 
 Moreover, not all of these lower court judges held the relatively 
progressive racial views of Judge Waring or Judge Wright (and 
Southern judges with such progressive racial views simply did not 
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exist prior to World War II).221 By the late 1940s, even some less ra-
cially enlightened jurists were willing to interpret the law in ways 
that facilitated black suffrage. One Florida circuit judge who invali-
dated that state’s white primary after Smith was a “cracker judge,” 
according to local NAACP officials.222 Such judges almost certainly 
would not have interpreted an anti-segregation ruling of the Supreme 
Court with equal latitude, as their post-Brown behavior would con-
firm.223 But apparently, many Southern white judges shared the hi-
erarchy of racial preferences embraced by the broader white commu-
nity, which meant that they were far less resistant to black political 
participation than to school desegregation.224 
 None of these conditions that combined to make Smith a momen-
tous decision—greater white receptiveness to black voting; increased 
black assertiveness; broader NAACP presence; augmented threat of 
federal prosecution for voting rights violations; growing physical se-
curity of Southern blacks; and lower courts’ willingness to support 
expansion of black suffrage—was itself simply a product of Smith. 
Thus, while the Court’s intervention may have been an indispensable 
factor in mobilizing the huge black voter registration of the 1940s, 
Smith probably would not have been very significant in the absence 
of these supportive conditions. 
 Thus far we have considered the contributions of Smith—
combined with certain favorable background social and political con-
ditions—to Southern black voter registration in the 1940s. Two other 
points regarding Smith’s impact warrant discussion. First, Smith af-
fected the behavior of Southern whites as well as blacks. While the 
Court’s ruling apparently inspired many Southern blacks to attempt 
to exercise their suffrage rights, it also mobilized Southern whites to 
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oppose black political participation.225 Second, while Southern black 
voter registration after Smith rose to roughly twenty percent in 1952, 
a large majority of Southern blacks remained disfranchised.226 
Southern blacks needed more than a Supreme Court ruling invali-
dating the white primary to enable them to exercise fully their rights 
of democratic citizenship. 
 The Justices sought to cushion the blow that Smith administered 
to Southern political traditions by reallocating the opinion-writing 
responsibilities from Felix Frankfurter, the Jewish Austrian immi-
grant from Harvard, to Stanley Reed, the native Kentuckian.227 That 
small concession to Southern sensibilities proved inefficacious. Many 
Southern Democrats trumpeted their defiance of Smith, warning fel-
low white Southerners that elimination of the white primary would 
jeopardize segregation and racial purity.228 Senator John Holmes 
Overton of Louisiana thundered that “[t]he South, at all costs, will 
maintain the rule of white supremacy.”229 Even Florida Senator 
Claude Pepper, one of the most liberal politicians in the South, 
breathed defiance when the decision in Smith was announced in the 
midst of his tough primary battle in April, 1944: “The South will al-
low nothing to impair white supremacy.”230 Democratic Party officials 
throughout the Deep South insisted that Smith would not affect their 
white primary policies.231 In fact, as we have seen, party officials did 
not permit blacks to vote in Democratic primaries in most counties of 
Florida, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Louisiana, and Missis-
sippi for at least a year or two after Smith.232 Southern newspapers 
cautioned that it was one thing for the Court to issue its edict and 
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quite another to enforce it, especially when the decision augured “a 
political and social revolution.”233 Southern white citizens warned 
that “you can[’]t push nigger equality on the South without a 
fight.”234 
 In some Southern states, Smith inspired efforts to suppress black 
voter registration. As we have seen, Alabama enacted the Boswell 
amendment to confer virtually unfettered discretion on registrars to 
reject black applicants, and Georgia likewise adopted more stringent 
registration requirements.235 As elimination of the white primary in-
spired more blacks to register, public officials became more intransi-
gent, strictly interpreting registration requirements whether or not 
state law authorized them to do so. Emory Jackson, secretary of the 
NAACP’s Birmingham branch, reported early in 1945 that local reg-
istrars were “getting worse” since Smith, and as a result the drive to 
register black voters did not “seem to be making much headway.”236 
The NAACP’s branch secretary in Marion County, Florida, observed 
late in 1945 that Southern whites had grown increasingly resigned to 
opening Democratic primaries to black participation and now were 
employing alternative methods to preserve white political suprem-
acy, such as fraud, economic intimidation, and physical violence.237 
Late in 1947 the executive committee of the Caddo Parish, Louisiana, 
Democratic Party rescinded its resolution excluding blacks from 
party primaries, but the parish registrar refused to enroll blacks un-
less they produced three white vouchers who were personally known 
to the registrar and resided in the same precinct as the registrant—
virtually impossible requirements for blacks to meet.238 
 The political backlash against Smith was greatest in South Caro-
lina and Mississippi, the two southern states with the largest black 
population percentages. Senator Burnet Maybank of South Carolina 
warned his Senate colleagues a few days after Smith that white 
Southerners “will not accept these interferences” and that “we of the 
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South will maintain our political and social institutions as we believe 
to be in the best interest of our people.”239 Governor Olin Johnston 
called the South Carolina Legislature into special session a few days 
later.240 Announcing that “[h]istory has taught us that we must keep 
our white Democratic primaries pure and unadulterated,”241 Johns-
ton urged the repeal of all 150 state laws regulating the Democratic 
Party, which on one reading of Smith would enable the party to con-
tinue operating a white primary without violating the Constitu-
tion.242 Should wholesale deregulation of the party fail, Johnston 
ominously warned, “we South Carolinians will use the necessary 
methods to retain white supremacy in our primaries and to safe-
guard the homes and happiness of our people.”243 Johnston concluded: 
“White supremacy will be maintained in our primaries. Let the chips 
fall where they may!”244 
 Likewise in Mississippi, Smith invigorated those whites most 
committed to preserving white political supremacy. The Jackson 
Daily News warned the Justices that they were badly mistaken if 
they believed blacks would vote in Mississippi Democratic prima-
ries.245 If any foolish person doubted this, “let ‘em try.”246 The worst 
manifestation of the Smith backlash materialized in Mississippi two 
years later.247 The combination of Smith and the aggressive effort of 
Southern blacks to implement it created a golden opportunity for 
white supremacist politicians.248 With Mississippi blacks seeking to 
register in unprecedented numbers, Senator Theodore Bilbo, running 
for reelection in the 1946 Democratic primary, invoked the specter of 
“Negro domination” in a state that had just (barely) ceased for the 
first time in a century to have a black majority.249 In a widely re-
ported campaign speech, Bilbo exhorted every “red-blooded white 
                                                                                                                    
 239. Cushman, supra note 197, at 75; C.P. Trussell, South Won’t Open Polls to Negroes, 
Maybank Warns, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1944, at 1. 
 240. Proclamation of Gov. Olin T. Johnston (Apr. 12, 1944), microformed on NAACP 
Papers, pt. IV, reel 10, fr. 481.  
 241. Olin T. Johnston, Speech to Joint Assembly and General Assembly of South Caro-
lina (Apr. 14, 1944), id. pt. IV, reel 10, frs. 481-82. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. at fr. 482. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Supreme Court Rules Out White Primaries, 51 THE CRISIS 164, 165 (May 1944). 
 246. Id. at 165. 
 247. For a similar effort by former governor Eugene Talmadge to capitalize on Smith in 
Georgia, see Tinder for Talmadge, NEWSWEEK, July 1, 1946, at 22, microformed on NAACP 
Papers, pt. IV, reel 7, fr. 723; Three States Top Week’s Primaries, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 
1946, at 1; ALEXANDER HEARD, A TWO-PARTY SOUTH? 192 (1952); SULLIVAN, supra note 69, 
at 211; Joseph L. Bernd, White Supremacy and the Disfranchisement of Blacks in Georgia, 
1946, 66 GA. HIST. Q. 492, 494-98 (1982). 
 248. See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 105, at 136; SULLIVAN, supra note 69, at 7. 
 249. DITTMER, supra note 127, at 2; LAWSON, supra note 10, at 99-100; Lewis, supra 
note 203, at 329, 332.  
2001]                          WHITE PRIMARY 93 
 
man to use any means to keep the niggers away from the polls.”250 
Declining explicitly to advocate violence, Bilbo slyly observed that 
“you know and I know what’s the best way to keep the nigger from 
voting. You do it the night before the election. I don’t have to tell you 
any more than that. Red-blooded men know what I mean.”251 
Throughout the state, enthusiastic supporters took the Senator at his 
word.252 Crosses were burnt in Jackson. In Biloxi, a sign at a street 
intersection warned blacks to “vote at your own risk.” In Pucket, 
Mississippi, four whites beat a black man and threatened to kill him 
for attempting to register. Whites brandishing pistols repulsed Med-
gar Evers and four other black veterans from the polls in Decatur, 
Mississippi. 
 Of course, the backlash created by Smith could generate its own 
counterbacklash. Mississippi Democrats could get away with threat-
ening and deploying deadly force against prospective black voters in 
1875 or even 1935, but no longer by 1945. Dominant public opinion in 
the nation simply could not bear Bilbo’s thinly veiled exhortations to 
violence. A white man from McAlester, Oklahoma, informed Bilbo 
that his speech was reminiscent of sentiments emanating from that 
“late departed and unlamented jerk in Germany” and admonished 
the Senator that “[t]he time for this narrow-minded race hatred stuff 
is out.”253 Bilbo unwittingly had challenged the Federal Government 
to prove that it had the inclination and capacity to enforce a Supreme 
Court decision against an obstreperous southern state.254 The United 
States Senate had little choice but to conduct investigative hearings, 
which took place under the chairmanship of Louisiana Senator Allen 
Ellender in early December 1946.255 Those hearings had an impor-
tant educational effect on Northern opinion, as well as a motivational 
impact on Mississippi blacks. The Northern Senators on the Ellender 
committee were shocked by the revelations of force and fraud used by 
white Mississippians to defeat black suffrage. A Washington Post edi-
torial noted that it was impossible to read the Senate committee’s re-
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port on Bilbo without “a sense of sickness” at the outright brutality 
displayed.256 Nearly 200 Mississippi blacks—many of them World 
War II veterans, some wearing their good conduct medals—showed 
up as volunteer witnesses at the Senate committee hearings con-
ducted in Jackson to testify to the physical violence they had endured 
for attempting to exercise their federal constitutional rights.257 Many 
more Mississippi blacks expressed renewed determination to enjoy 
the benefits of democratic citizenship by appearing at registrars’ of-
fices. Black voter registration in Mississippi rose by fifty percent in 
the year following the Bilbo hearings. Other incidents involving vio-
lent (indeed deadly) suppression of the efforts of Southern blacks to 
vote in the late 1940s likewise proved to have “terrific publicity 
value” for the voter registration campaign.258 It was one thing to use 
obfuscation to prevent Southern blacks from voting; it was quite an-
other to use deadly force. 
 Much as public opinion was repulsed by the use of violence to 
suppress black suffrage in Mississippi, so was judicial opinion alien-
ated by the persistent use of evasive tactics to circumvent Smith in 
South Carolina. Judge Waring became infuriated as state Democratic 
officials responded to his rulings with further efforts at circumven-
tion. When South Carolina repealed all of its statutes regulating po-
litical parties after Smith, Judge Waring decreed that the time had 
come for the state to “rejoin the Union,” and he ordered party offi-
cials to allow blacks to vote in primaries.259 They responded instead 
by adopting a dual party membership status based on race and a loy-
alty oath designed to offend prospective black members. A furious 
Judge Waring invalidated these new party rules and declared that 
“the time has come when racial discrimination in political affairs 
[has] got to stop.”260 He did not “care whether there [were] any people 
who agree[d] with [him]”;261 South Carolina must obey the law of the 
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land. Waring warned that any future violations of the letter or spirit 
of his order were “going to be punished by imprisonment.”262 One 
wonders if Supreme Court Justices, observing party and public offi-
cials evading High Court rulings, might have shared Waring’s grow-
ing irritation, as well as his determination to expand legal interpre-
tations where necessary to counter Southern efforts at circumven-
tion. Certainly the Justices’ willingness to find unconstitutional state 
action in Terry v. Adams is consistent with that hypothesis.263 
 In sum, while Smith generated a white supremacist backlash in 
Deep South politics, the violence and evasion that ensued generated 
their own counterbacklashes. National opinion by the mid-1940s no 
longer countenanced the violent suppression of black suffrage in Mis-
sissippi. Revulsion against this sort of brutality contributed signifi-
cantly to the development of a national civil rights consciousness in 
the postwar years, which in turn influenced President Truman’s ra-
cial policies.264 Moreover, the fraudulent evasive tactics of public and 
party officials after Smith inspired a similar backlash in judicial 
opinion, as federal judges tired of the seemingly endless capacity of 
Southern officials to devise new methods of obstructing black suf-
frage. 
 Notwithstanding the impressive gains made in black voter regis-
tration in the postwar period, black voting in the South remained 
confined largely to cities and towns. In rural areas, especially in the 
Deep South, the overwhelming majority of blacks remained disfran-
chised.265 Thus, for example, while an estimated 22,000 blacks were 
registered to vote in Atlanta by 1946,266 in dozens of Deep South 
counties, many of which had black majorities, not a single black per-
son was registered to vote.267 In Louisiana, black voter registration 
had exploded in 1948 from 8,000 to 43,000, yet roughly fifty percent 
of those black voters lived in New Orleans, and in half of the state’s 
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sixty-four parishes, not a single black person voted.268 Well over 
100,000 blacks had registered to vote in Georgia by 1948, and 
roughly 300,000 had enrolled in Texas, yet Mississippi and Alabama 
showed “no progress,”269 as black voter registration in those states 
was limited to a paltry 3,000 and 8,000, respectively.270 
 One of the most formidable obstacles to black voting in the rural 
South remained the threat and reality of physical violence. In the 
mid-1940s the South was a less violent place for blacks asserting 
their constitutional rights than it had been even ten years earlier,271 
but it was still plenty violent. While blacks in Florida cities had reg-
istered in large numbers by the late 1940s, prospective black voters 
in rural parts of the state had to endure KKK intimidation, letters 
warning that those who dared to vote would “be floating up and down 
the river,”272 and shots fired into their homes.273 Tens of thousands of 
blacks registered to vote in Louisiana’s urban parishes, while most 
rural blacks remained “afraid to even try to register because of re-
peated examples of brutality and threatened acts against their 
physical safety.”274 Rural blacks in Louisiana received written notes 
from the KKK threatening to put black voters “out of business”275 and 
warnings that whites were “figuring on raising Hell”276 if blacks 
turned out at the polls. Sheriffs and deputy sheriffs in rural Alabama 
terrorized blacks who dared attempt to register.277 Thousands of 
blacks voted with little resistance in Georgia cities such as Atlanta, 
Savannah, and Augusta by 1946, but rural blacks had to endure 
KKK intimidation and warnings that any black man who voted 
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would be “a dead Nigger.”278 Most rural Georgia blacks heeded gu-
bernatorial candidate Eugene Talmadge’s warnings to stay away 
from the polls. In Mississippi, even the cities remained dangerous. 
The editor of a black newspaper in Jackson reported that fear was 
the reason why only 315 of the 40,000 blacks living in that city 
registered to vote in 1946.279 The Jackson Daily News published the 
names of blacks who were prominent in the Mississippi Progressive 
Voters League and warned that the best way “to prevent unhealthy 
and unhappy results” was for blacks to stay away from Democratic 
primaries.280 
 Prospective black voters in the rural Deep South had good reason 
to be frightened. A recently discharged veteran, Etoy Fletcher, tried 
to register in rural Mississippi in 1946. The registrar informed him 
that “Niggers are not allowed to vote in Rankin County, and if you 
don’t want to get into serious trouble get out of this building . . . .”281 
While waiting for a bus out of town, Fletcher was assaulted by four 
white men who drove him several miles into the woods, “beat[ ] and 
flogged [him] mercilessly,” and threatened to kill him if he ever again 
attempted to vote.282 Many other aspiring black voters in Mississippi 
reported similar assaults during the summer of 1946,283 as “every-
thing short of murder”284 was perpetrated upon them. In Gadsden 
County, Florida, two black half-brothers, J.T. Smith and Harry 
Moody, helped mobilize 150 blacks to register in 1947 and 1948. 
Then, ignoring warnings from several whites, they turned out at the 
polls themselves in May, 1948. As a result, one of them had his home 
blown up, crippling one of his children, and both of them were run 
out of town.285 In Montgomery County, Georgia, D.V. Carter organ-
ized an NAACP branch in 1946 consisting mainly of farmers and 
sharecroppers and devoted principally to voter registration activi-
ties.286 Several hundred blacks registered as a result of these efforts. 
After ignoring repeated threats from the KKK to desist from his suf-
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frage activities, Carter was severely beaten in 1948. Isaac Nixon, 
whom Carter had persuaded to vote, was murdered for doing so.287 
An all-white jury acquitted the two white brothers responsible for 
killing Carter.288 In Louisiana in 1951, a white deputy sheriff killed, 
allegedly in self-defense, a black man who happened to be one of the 
plaintiffs in an NAACP voting rights case.289 Harry Moore, founder of 
Florida’s Progressive Voters League, was assassinated by a bomb 
planted in his home on Christmas night, 1951—possibly in retalia-
tion for his voting rights work.290 
 While the Justice Department was more attentive to NAACP con-
cerns by the late 1940s, it remained reluctant to prosecute public and 
party officials who obstructed black voting. Democratic administra-
tions in Washington, D.C., had political incentives not to prosecute 
Southern Democrats, because doing so might “translate impotent 
rumblings against the New Deal into actual revolt at the polls.”291 
Moreover, Southern United States attorneys, especially if ambitious 
for elective office, were not eager to prosecute voting cases.292 Even 
for those who were, these cases proved difficult to win. Prosecutors 
had trouble locating witnesses, as local communities protected cul-
prits behind a veil of silence.293 Most importantly, local white jurors 
simply would not convict registrars or party officials for adhering to 
traditional mores rejecting black suffrage.294 Thus, the NAACP’s con-
stant pressure on the Justice Department to prosecute voting cases 
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went for naught—to the great frustration of the Association, which 
had deferred numerous civil lawsuits on the view that criminal 
prosecutions should take priority.295 NAACP officials believed that 
they had a “distinct understanding”296 with the Justice Department 
that it would prosecute voting cases in 1944-45, and they had ample 
reason for concluding that the Department was “doubledealing.”297 
Even in cases of patent constitutional violations, the Department re-
fused to prosecute. Where prospective black voters had been beaten 
or killed, the Department conducted investigations, but even in these 
cases no prosecutions resulted.298 In the end, the empty threat of fed-
eral prosecution proved inadequate to deter those Southern whites 
who were committed to obstructing black suffrage through force or 
fraud. 
 Violence and the Justice Department’s failure to prosecute it were 
not the only obstacles to black voting in the rural Deep South. Blacks 
daring to exercise their suffrage rights faced likely economic retalia-
tion, which posed a special problem in rural areas where blacks were 
almost entirely dependent upon whites for employment (unlike in 
Southern cities, where the segregated economy had produced a class 
of black professionals—doctors, dentists, undertakers, and minis-
ters—who were largely independent of white economic pressure).299 
Public officials in Mobile, Alabama, struggled mightily to have John 
LeFlore, the energetic chairman of the NAACP’s Regional Conference 
of Southern Branches, fired from his job with the United States 
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Postal Service in retaliation for his voter registration activity.300 Nor 
were lawsuits to vindicate constitutional suffrage rights a realistic 
option for indigent rural blacks.301 Even those who could afford to sue 
might not be able to find a lawyer willing to take voting rights cases. 
Very few black lawyers practiced in the rural South, and many white 
lawyers remained reluctant to challenge black disfranchisement.302 
 Moreover, litigation challenging the political status quo in the ru-
ral Deep South entailed possible risks, both for clients and attor-
neys.303 A black lawyer named Arthur Madison, who sued to compel 
Montgomery County, Alabama, registrars to enroll black applicants 
in 1944, was arrested, convicted, and then summarily disbarred for 
representing clients without authorization.304 The county sheriff had 
intimidated Madison’s clients into withdrawing their consent to his 
representation.305 No white lawyers were willing to defend Madison 
at his trial. In another incident, a black minister from Louisville, 
Mississippi, informed the NAACP of his unsuccessful effort to vote in 
the Democratic primary in July 1946.306 He wanted the Justice De-
partment informed, but because of “the social condition of the Deep 
south,” 307 he did not want his name used publicly until it was time to 
testify in court, because publicity would put his life in jeopardy. Fi-
nally, such lawsuits, even if they could be brought without inciting 
retaliation, were hardly a cinch to win. Many federal judges by the 
early 1950s were willing to enjoin registrars from engaging in ra-
cially discriminatory practices, but were not yet prepared to invali-
date vaguely worded literacy tests or to command that particular 
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black applicants be registered, for fear of usurping registrars’ author-
ity.308 
 Blacks in the rural South would not vote in significant numbers 
until further interventions by the Supreme Court and, more impor-
tantly, by Congress and the President—developments that did not 
take place for the most part until the 1960s. Only the federal execu-
tive could secure the physical safety of black voters in the Deep 
South. Only Congress could lift the burden of litigating voting rights 
violations from the shoulders of individual blacks and place it on the 
Federal Government by empowering the Attorney General to seek in-
junctions against registrars who practiced race discrimination—a 
remedy that also had the advantage of avoiding (white) Southern 
juries.309 More importantly, only Congress could threaten to replace 
local registrars with federal officials if discrimination against black 
registrants did not cease.310 The Supreme Court in 1966 finally in-
validated the poll tax in the few Southern states that continued to 
employ that suffrage restriction.311 Yet because the Court continued 
to reject constitutional challenges to literacy tests as late as 1959, 
further congressional intervention was necessary to eliminate that 
obstacle to black voter registration.312 
 Smith v. Allwright, in conjunction with receptive social and politi-
cal conditions, launched a racial revolution in Southern politics. But 
it could not overcome the obstacles to black voting in the rural Deep 
South. Only intervention by the political branches of the National 
Government could secure to all Southern blacks the right to partici-
pate in politics on the same terms as Southern whites. That inter-
vention was mainly a product of the 1960s civil rights movement.313 
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V.   CONCLUSION 
 It is interesting to speculate why Smith proved so much more effi-
cacious than either roughly contemporaneous criminal procedure de-
cisions involving the rights of Southern blacks or the slightly later 
ruling in Brown v. Board of Education. While nearly one million 
Southern blacks registered to vote in the decade after Smith, essen-
tially no blacks served on Southern criminal juries as long as two 
decades after Norris v. Alabama,314 and fewer than two percent of 
Southern black school children attended integrated schools a decade 
after Brown.315 A variety of factors may determine the relative effi-
cacy of particular Court decisions. 
 One reason Smith may have had more dramatic consequences for 
black voter registration than Brown had for Southern school deseg-
regation is that the black community was more united behind, and 
more intensely committed to, securing the right to vote than the 
right to attend integrated schools. Voting is preservative of other 
rights,316 and many black leaders through the 1950s insisted that if 
Southern blacks were genuinely protected in their right to vote, they 
could secure other rights for themselves through the political proc-
ess.317 Also, the democratic ideology of World War II more directly 
implicated the right to vote than the right to nonsegregated educa-
tion. How could one possibly justify denial of suffrage rights to sol-
diers who had risked their lives on the battlefield?318 Southern black 
servicemen returning home in the mid-1940s often took their dis-
charge papers straight to city hall so they could register to vote. They 
did not proceed directly to the local school board, demanding inte-
grated education for their children; legal challenges to public school 
segregation were still several years in the offing.  
 Moreover, the black community historically had been far more di-
vided over the pursuit of integrated education than over suffrage 
rights.319 The prospect of genuinely equal, though separate, schools 
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held some real appeal to segments of the black community. Separate 
black schools offered job opportunities for black teachers in an era in 
which few white collar occupations were open to blacks. They pro-
vided an educational environment generally free from the stereotyp-
ing, insult, and humiliation that characterized the black school 
child’s experience in that era’s integrated schools. Finally, black 
schools usually presented a more sympathetic portrayal of African-
American history and culture. None of this is to deny that most Afri-
can Americans had become enthusiastic integrationists by the post-
World War II period. It is simply to suggest that the black commu-
nity may have been somewhat more united, as well as intensely 
committed, on the issue of suffrage rights than on the question of in-
tegrated education. 
 Southern whites, on the other hand, certainly were less intent on 
resisting black suffrage than integrated education by the late 1940s. 
Black disfranchisement always had occupied a lower rung on the 
white supremacist hierarchy of racial preferences than had school 
segregation. By the 1940s, many moderate white Southerners explic-
itly endorsed the removal of barriers to black political participation, 
while remaining adamantly committed to the preservation of public 
school segregation.320 Whites had a harder time justifying black dis-
franchisement to themselves in light of rising black educational lev-
els and the democratic ideology of World War II. School integration, 
on the other hand, involved race mixing of young children, male and 
female, and therefore inevitably entailed for most white Southerners 
connotations of miscegenation.321 Most Southern whites probably also 
were more resistant to black jury service than to black political par-
ticipation. Even if blacks became fully enfranchised, whites would re-
tain secure political majorities in most Southern counties and in all 
Southern states. But criminal juries generally operated on the basis 
of unanimity, not simple majority rule. Thus, the presence of a single 
black person on a criminal jury could block the conviction of, say, a 
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black man charged with raping a white woman or killing a white 
man allegedly in self-defense.322 Whites concerned about maintaining 
effective social control over blacks needed to exclude them from juries 
more than they needed to bar them from politics. 
 Furthermore, some constitutional rights prove easier to circum-
vent than others. White Southerners discovered late in the nine-
teenth century that the most effective means of evading federal con-
stitutional constraints was to delegate unfettered discretion to local 
administrative officials, who could effectively maintain white su-
premacy without openly violating the Fourteenth or Fifteenth 
Amendments. This is how Southern blacks were universally excluded 
from jury service, disfranchised, and cheated out of their fair share of 
public school funds.323 Over time, however, some of these administra-
tive schemes for perpetuating white supremacy became more difficult 
to sustain than others. As blacks became better educated, registrars 
had a more difficult time maintaining with a straight face that black 
voter applicants had flunked literacy tests that many less well-
educated whites had passed. The same was true regarding black 
representation on jury venires, but the critical difference here was 
that the peremptory challenge enabled prosecutors to exclude even 
qualified blacks from serving on petit juries through the 1980s.324 
There was no analogue to the peremptory challenge in the suffrage 
context. 
 In addition, alleged denials of constitutional rights often turn on 
disputed facts that may prove harder to establish in some contexts 
than in others. For example, a black Ph.D. from Tuskegee probably 
would not have had a difficult time demonstrating that he or she was 
denied the right to register to vote because of race rather than be-
cause of failure to pass a literacy test. On the other hand, a black 
criminal defendant crossing swords with a local sheriff over whether 
his confession was voluntarily given or induced by a beating would 
have had a much harder time convincing a (white) fact-finder of the 
veracity of his account. Thus, the disparate evidentiary burdens in-
herent in establishing particular constitutional violations may help 
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explain why Court decisions protecting black suffrage rights proved 
more efficacious than those forbidding coerced confessions. Relatedly, 
judges and jurors probably found some rights-bearers more sympa-
thetic litigants than others. Black criminal defendants—indigent, of-
ten illiterate and frequently guilty of some crime even if not the one 
with which they were charged—were less attractive rights-bearers 
than the middle class, well-educated blacks who endeavored to vote 
in the postwar years. 
 The relative availability of sanctions for violations may have been 
another important factor in determining whether particular constitu-
tional rights were successfully implemented. In the 1940s, law en-
forcement officers and jury commissioners had little direct incentive 
to respect the constitutional rights of black criminal defendants be-
cause civil or criminal sanctions for violating those rights generally 
were unavailable. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Screws v. 
United States,325 courts could impose criminal liability under federal 
civil rights statutes only in cases involving a crystal clear constitu-
tional violation; official behavior anywhere near the line of permissi-
bility did not qualify as a “willful” violation under the Court’s inter-
pretation.326 Even in Screws, where the sheriff had wantonly mur-
dered a black prisoner, several Justices balked at applying the fed-
eral civil rights statutes.327 It is far from clear that a majority of Jus-
tices in the 1940s would have been willing to impose federal criminal 
liability on a law enforcement officer who had beaten a defendant 
into confessing. Federal lawsuits seeking damages for coerced confes-
sions were equally unpromising. In the 1940s, it was not clear that 
state officials acting in violation of state law—and every state for-
bade coerced confessions—could be sued under the federal civil rights 
statutes.328 Moreover, plaintiffs in such cases—by definition, alleged 
criminals—were unlikely to arouse great sympathy among jurors.  
 By way of contrast, Southern voter registrars and party officials 
were more susceptible to legal sanctions. After Smith, a party official 
refusing to allow blacks to participate in party primaries had com-
mitted a clear constitutional violation that might qualify for federal 
criminal prosecution, even under Screws’ restrictive standard. Civil 
lawsuits were an even more realistic possibility. The Court’s first two 
white primary cases—Herndon in 1927 and Condon in 1932—had 
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sustained damages actions under federal civil rights statutes against 
public officials who refused to allow blacks to participate in Democ-
ratic Party primaries. Perhaps one reason that Southern school 
boards successfully resisted Brown’s mandate for so long was that 
school desegregation litigation in its early phases never sought 
monetary remedies.329 
 Two final factors that may have influenced the relative efficacy of 
particular Court decisions in the civil rights context were the quality 
of the lawyers and the type of courts involved in enforcing the respec-
tive rights. Constitutional rights have little value without effective 
lawyers to raise them, and black criminal defendants almost invaria-
bly were impecunious. The court-appointed lawyers they received in 
capital cases often simply went through the motions of presenting a 
defense and failed to challenge even clear violations of their clients’ 
constitutional rights.330 By way of contrast, blacks challenging deni-
als of their voting rights hired their own lawyers. After World War II, 
they increasingly found that white lawyers were willing to undertake 
challenges to black disfranchisement. They also discovered that 
more, and better qualified, black lawyers were now practicing in the 
South.331 
 Finally, state appellate and federal judges were more likely than 
state trial judges to vindicate the constitutional rights of Southern 
blacks, because they were better educated, more professionalized, 
and more independent of local public opinion that may have been 
hostile to those rights. Yet, the cases of black criminal defendants 
usually did not proceed beyond trial courts, since state provision of 
counsel for indigents generally did not extend to appeals. Blacks liti-
gating voting rights cases, by way of contrast, were free to choose the 
forum in which they sued—generally federal court—and they often 
commanded the resources necessary to pursue their cases to appel-
late courts, which were more likely to sympathize with their claims. 
Moreover, the traditional hierarchy of white supremacist values in-
fluenced Southern judges as much as anyone else. These judges, as 
we have seen, were far more likely to sympathize with, and thus to 
construe liberally, Smith v. Allwright than Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion.332 
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 For all of these reasons, Smith proved more efficacious than did 
contemporaneous criminal procedure decisions involving the rights of 
Southern blacks or the later ruling in Brown. The lesson seems clear: 
Supreme Court rulings may have more dramatic consequences in 
some contexts than in others. While Brown desegregated relatively 
few Southern schools for a decade,333 Smith v. Allwright, in conjunc-
tion with a propitious set of social and political conditions, set in mo-
tion a political revolution in the urban South. 
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